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Book Review 
Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado, How Lawyers Lose Their Way: A Prifession 
Fails Its Creative Minds. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005. Pp. 
xiv + r38. 
Reviewed by Milton C. Regan, Jr. 
Introduction 
Jean Stcfaneic and Richard Delgado's new book describes several surveys 
and studies that suggest that a disturbing percentage of practicing lawyers 
are unhappy. The authors note a "high rate of burnout, job dissatisfaction, 
divorce, depression, suicide, and drug and alcohol addiction" among lawyers 
(sI). Many in practice face "unrealistic demands for billable hours, narrow 
specialization, inadequate opportunities for creativity, and intense competi-
tion for jobs, clients, and partnerships" (sr). As a result, "[m Jany lawyers regret 
having entered law at all and contemplate leaving for another field. Each year, 
about forty thousand actually do" (ra). 
One plausible explanation for this state of affairs is that lawyers simply 
work too much. Billing 2,000 or more hours a year translates into an even 
larger number of hours at the office and in airplanes, trains, and taxis. Add 
to this long commutes to work, instant availability via e-mail and cell phones, 
and demands for ever more rapid responses to drafts of documents. The result 
is that lawyers in the United States are a prime example of what Juliet Schor 
calls the "overworked American."1 Stefaneic and Delgado themselves note that 
"[IJawyers have little leisure time to think about their cases, much less for fam-
ily and recreational pursuits" (46). 
How Lawyers Lose Their rMly claims, however, that lawyers' unease stems from a 
distinctive source: their excessive use of and exposure to "formalism" in their 
work. J think that they are on to something, but the analysis in this book is too 
underdeveloped to provide much insight into what it is. The authors' use of 
the term "formalism" risks being so inclusive that it loses explanatory power. 
In addition, their claim that overreliance on formalism is the chief culprit in 
Milton C. Regan,Jr. is a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center. 
Citations to How Lawyers lim Their Wily appear as parentheticals in the text. 
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lawyers' unhappiness is vulnerable to the charge that lawyers arc suffering the 
effect of trends in the workplace affecting a wide range of occupations. 
Finally, Stefancic and Delgado fail to explore in any depth the material 
conditions of law practice, and how the evolution of those conditions might 
relate to the formalism they decry. Their treatment of formalism is, well, for-
malistic. Formalism seems to be an independent force that rises, falls, and now 
has reemerged, on its own. This makes it difficult to identify any steps that 
might help reshape law practice beyond the personal responses of individual 
lawyers. The result is that the authors leave us with no sense of any collective 
efforts holding out any promise. The book ends with an associate at a law firm 
whose consciousness has been raised about the tyranny of formalism. What 
does she do? She adds a few items to her list of things she dislikes about her 
job, and then resolves, "Tomorrow, I'm going to find time to check out that 
new bookstore I've been wanting to see" (85). 
One can't help but be disappointed at this conclusion. In what follows, I 
layout the authors' arguments, and suggest how its limitations lead to this 
result. I then offer some thoughts on how what I think of as hyperabstraction 
may well pose particular hazards for lawyers, which could have broader social 
ramifications as well. 
The Reign of Formalism 
Stefancic and Delgado begin by arguing that the underlying source of many 
lawyers' unhappiness is that they are captives of formalism. Formalism, they 
maintain, abstracts from daily life, substituting reliance on impersonal concep-
tual categories for appreciation of the richness and complexity of experience. 
The lawyer engaged in formalism spends her time in the exercise of a "narrow, 
technocratic facility at manipulating doctrine, cleverly and endlessly" (80). 
According to the authors, immersion in this task cuts lawyers off from creative 
fulfillment. By subjecting all before it to the "narrative-killing, subdividing, 
compartmentalizing impulse" (84), formalism effectively turns lawyers into 
machines who are at least one step removed from real engagement with life. 
This occurs, the authors argue, because: 
legal formalism hammers reality-in the form, for example of a client who 
swindled two hundred widows by selling them worthless stock-into existing 
doctrines and precedents. It asks whether the case calls up this precedent or 
that, whether regulation is permissible under this governmental power or the 
other. Deeming most of the facts of the case irrelevant-including many that 
would be considered relevant by most citizens-it pronounces this case like 
some previous one, and not some other. Even when correct within its narrow 
system, this is always a kind of world-killing exercise-in less polite language, 
a lie (82). 
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The authors' complaint is not that formalism has no place in legal thought, 
but that it has come to dominate the lawyer's work. This produces an imbal-
ance that accounts for the "high-paid misery" (77) that so many lawyers seem 
to experience. We need, they argue, a "balance of rigor and imagination" in 
the practice and interpretation of law (78). Lawyers need to move closer to 
this balance, so they can be treated as "autonomous professionals capable of 
imagination, discovery, original thought, and dissent" (78). 
The authors maintain that the stories of the poet Ezra Pound and the law-
yer and poet Archibald MacLeish illuminate these themes. The paths of the 
two crossed intermittently in the early decades of the twentieth century, with 
MacLeish admiring Pound's work but Pound rarely returning the favor. Pound 
"became the acknowledged architect of modern poetry, dismantling the ornate 
language of the Victorian tradition and replacing it with sharp images, precise 
words, and metrical variation" (7). In other words, Pound challenged the pre-
vailing formalist paradigm of poetry, and attempted to create a style that more 
directly elicited the texture of experience. In this respect, Pound serves for 
Stefancic and Delgado as an example of the impulse toward the particular. 
Unfortunately, Pound also drifted toward fascism and anti-Semitism, and 
recorded more than one hundred radio broadcasts from Italy praising Beni-
to Mussolini and excoriating Franklin Roosevelt and the Vnited States. He 
eventually was indicted for treason and transferred to V nited States military 
authorities at the end of the Second World War. Pound ultimately was com-
mitted to St. Elizabeth's Hospital for the Criminally Insane on the basis of 
testimony that his eccentric views and personal habits reflected an unsound 
mind. 
MacLeish grew up as a member of the V nited States social elite and served 
in various high public positions during his career. He was both a lawyer and 
a poet who sought to reconcile these two dimensions of his personality and 
experience-with only limited success, according to Stefancic and Delgado. 
MacLeish rejected a legal career because he saw it as too stifling-a "mockery 
of human ambitions" (IS). He longed instead for what he saw as the more 
spiritually rewarding path of poetry. Stefancic and Delgado suggest, however, 
that MacLeish was never fully able to shake the influence of formalist tradi-
tions in both law and literature, which prevented him from achieving a sense 
of balance and satisfaction in his life. 
MacLeish admired Pound's ability to break free of formalist conventions, 
and sought advice from him about his own work. Pound was dismissive 
because he felt that MacLeish's work "was derivative and that he would never 
amount to anything until he learned to write simply and without affectation" 
(17). Although MacLeish won the Pulitzer Prize for his poem "Conquisti-
dar," he never gained acceptance into inner literary circles. MacLeish peri-
odically provided financial assistance to Pound, and eventually used his legal 
skills to frce Pound from St. Elizabeth's in 1958. The poet moved to Italy, 
where he lived until his death in 1972. "By saving Pound," the authors argue, 
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"MacLeish could achieve vicariously that which he himself had allowed to 
drift away" (27)' 
Stefancic and Delgado assert that the stories of Pound and MacLeish illus-
trate the importance of a balance between rigor and imagination. They suggest 
that Pound represents the dangers of imagination without discipline. "The 
raging, out-of-control Pound, whose mind raced from one crackpot theory 
to another," lacked the rigor that MacLeish had gained in law school (78). 
They see MacLeish as emblematic of the difficulty of achieving such a bal-
ance for someone raised on legal and literary formalism. His life, they suggest, 
demonstrates how "[fJormalism ... imposes unbearable pressures on creative, 
high-spirited human beings" (:30). His experience "is a metaphor for what is 
starting to go wrong with the world of work" (84). 
What can we do to address this malady? The authors argue that lawyers 
must use "anti-formalism and critical analysis" (84). Law students need to 
"develop[] their own critique of social institutions and the role oflaw" in order 
to "stave off professional disappointment" (so). This may help young lawyers 
understand the source of the pressures they face, so that they can either make 
peace with them or learn how to counter them. 
Limitations of the Thesis 
The first difficulty with this hook is that Stefancic and Delgado use formal-
ism to encompass a wide variety of phenomena, which seem united mainly 
by the fact that the authors regard them as undesirable. Using the term so 
capaciously makes it difficult to be clear about what precisely is the source of 
so many lawyers' unhappiness. 
One meaning included in the term is legal formalism. They define this as 
"a conception oflegal reasoning that emphasizes internal rather than external 
factors in generating legal decisions" (34). It focuses on regularity and predict-
ability, limiting decision makers to the consideration of a relatively small num-
ber of factors. Decisions therefore turn on "categorical questions" rather than 
assessment of social consequences (:34). This creates a problem: "Formalism is 
a rule of exlusion. Life, however, is diverse and unruly" (:35)-
Legal formalism, the authors argue, influences legal education by promot-
ing reliance on the Socratic method and the analysis of doctrine. "The profes-
sor asks what the rule of the case is and how it squares with that of a previous 
one. He or she asks how the case would come out if one of the facts were differ-
ent, say, if the defendant were a child. (The student is supposed to remember 
that a different rule comes in)" (:35). This fosters the view that the law is an 
autonomous discipline that need not consult other sources of knowledge for 
insight. 
Stefancic and Delgado contend that formalism also is reflected in Supreme 
Court decisions that are hostile to progressive social thought or interdisci-
plinary analysis. Formalism means reliance on doctrines such as federalism, 
original intent, and extreme textualism, for instance, to strike down affirmative 
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action programs and to reject the claim of discriminatory administration of the 
death penalty. 
Moreover, the authors argue, legal formalism is but one version of a phe-
nomenon that extends to other disciplines. I t is reflected in literature in the 
desire to restrict study to the traditional Western canon; in literary interpreta-
tion in a focus on the text of a work rather than the broader circumstances in 
which it was produced; and in history in the desire to limit study to wars and 
the careers of famous men. In the realm of politics, formalism gives rise to 
opposition to immigrants and to "the desire to keep the nation demographi-
cally pure" (xi). 
At this point, the term has begun to lose its value as an explanation for the 
unease that many lawyers feel. Exactly what is it that unites Socratic peda-
gogy, the traditional Western canon, anti-immigration policies, a focus on 
wars and great men, reliance on doctrine and precedent, Lochner v. New Yark, 
and the general practice of using conceptual categories to impose order on 
experience? Socrates' insistent interrogation, for instance, did not seek to 
inculcate admiration for convention and the status quo nor a life devoted to 
the memorization and manipulation of rules. How then is the method that 
uses his name formalist? 
Furthermore, Bush v. Gore' and the Bush administration lawyers' memos on 
torture3 likely would rank high on a list oflegal analyses with which Stefancic 
and Delgado disagree. Yet the problem in each instance arguably is that the 
analysts were too acutely sensitive to the particular parties and specific cir-
cumstances of the situations they faced. Greater adherence to precedent and 
to the conceptual integrity of federalism, as well as to the text of the Geneva 
Convention, probably would have produced outcomes more satisfactory to 
progressives. Yet such an approach would be more formalistic in that it would 
abstract from the particularities of the cases at hand in order to seek consis-
tency with past decisions. 
Finally, a focus on wars or notable individuals in history can be more atten-
tive to specific detail, and to the caprice and unruliness of human experience, 
than, for instance, Marxist historical analysis that focuses on events as reflec-
tions of the underlying contradictions of capitalism or the proletariat's role in 
history. Similarly, the historical study of women and minorities can be formal-
ist in some hands when it is put in the service of sweeping claims of patriarchy 
and oppression, or can provide rich details of everyday life that defy easy cat-
egorization. Each approach can operate at different levels of abstraction and 
provide different kinds of insights. 
The authors' elastic notion of formalism therefore makes it difficult to dis-
cern the features of thc culprit that they hold responsible for thc deadening of 
many modern lawyers' lives. Even their conception of the more limited idea 
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
3. See Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: American, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror (New 
York, 2004). 
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of legal formalism goes beyond the historical significance of this approach 
to legal analysis. Stefancic and Delgado seem to suggest that any attempt to 
reconcile current with past decisions, to achieve consistent outcomes across 
different cases, or to abstract from the multiplicity of details presented by a 
given situation, represents the hand of formalism. The reader must struggle to 
clarify the meaning of the key concept of the book. 
What seems to be the most coherent definition of formalism is the use of 
abstraction from experience to attempt to impose order and predictability on a 
world that is disorderly and unpredictable-but also vital and generative. This 
is consistent with Stefancic and Delgado's portrait of Pound as imprisoned 
by a radical particularism that left him defenseless against the onslaughts of 
prejudice and emotion. Had he been better able to regard events against a 
broader cognitive background that utilized more general conceptual catego-
ries, perhaps he would have had the means to reflect more critically on his 
impulses and ideas. At the same time, the source of his poetic power may have 
resided in this very limitation. 
The authors' discussion of Pound underscores that they acknowledge the 
need for some degree of abstraction to make sense of the world. Most of us 
have a powerful need to move beyond the experience of a succession of stimuli 
to a sense of coherence and meaning. The use of general categories to encom-
pass a variety of ostensibly similar particular phenomena is a crucial tool in 
this process.4 
Stefancic and Delgado thus suggest that the problem for lawyers is not the 
use of formalism per se, but an imbalance between formalism and more direct 
modes of apprehending life. They argue that this imbalance risks producing 
lawyers who are deadened to existence because they see experience only as 
various instances of more general phenomena-and hence operate at a step 
removed from the vitality of human life. Their diagnosis of modem lawyers' 
unhappiness is that many are engaged in work devoted mostly to manipulat-
ing abstract categories, which estranges them from the emotional and imagi-
native dimensions of experience. 
This formulation of the problem raises at least two questions. First, Ste-
fancic and Delgado posit a dichotomy between abstraction and order on the 
one hand and particularism and creativity on the other. Computer engineers, 
analytic philosophers, and mathematicians spend a large proportion of their 
working lives engaged in the manipulation of abstractions. Yet many of them 
feel that they are engaged in an exhilarating creative endeavor. On the other 
hand, social workers, child care providers, and department store clerks spend 
most of their time dealing directly with the specific needs of particular indi-
viduals. Yet many feel burned out by their work. Abstraction, it seems, is not 
necessarily the enemy, nor particularism the friend, of creativity. 
4. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise 
on the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, NY., (967). 
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Elsewhere, Stefancic and Delgado describe the problem of disenchantment 
in somewhat different terms. They suggest that "routinization and specializa-
tion" are the enemies of creativity, along with intense productivity demands 
(sI). Thus, a young lawyer may spend months or even years researching nar-
row points oflaw, or reviewing hundreds of thousands of documents, all while 
being pressured to bill 2,000 or more hours a year. Perhaps, then, the problem 
is being required to engage constantly in routine and narrowly defined tasks. 
This diagnosis may seem sounder than one that focuses simply on the degree 
of abstraction in someone's work day. Yet it immediately elicits the observation 
that the problem is not limited to lawyers. Many workers in a variety of fields 
feel the same pressure and pinched circumstances. As Richard Posner sug-
gests, lawyers are simply late arrivals to an experience that other workers have 
had for some time: the "industrialization" of work.) For a long time, lawyers 
had guild-like control over the production of legal services, which insulated 
them from the full brunt of market forces that shaped other sectors of the 
economy. That control now has eroded, swept away by developments such as 
the invalidation of restrictions on advertising and legal fees, the rise of more 
influential in-house corporate legal departments, and increases in the scope 
and specialization of legal services in response to the demands of transna-
tional corporations. 
Lawyers now are more directly exposed to the chilly winds of competition 
than perhaps ever before, which increases demands for the efficient delivery 
of legal services. Is that, however, necessarily a problem? As Posner notes of 
current law practice, "Naturally it is less fun. Competitive markets are no fun 
at all for most sellers; the effect of competition is to transform most producer 
surplus into consumer surplus, and in more or less time to drive the less effi-
cient producers out ofbusiness."6 
Seen from this perspective, lawyers' lament seems like whining and special 
pleading. Why should the rest of us care that lawyers have lost their oligopoly 
power and now must compete in the marketplace like everyone else? What 
makes them more an object of interest or concern than any other group of 
workers who must labor under the current conditions of a global capitalist 
economy? 
Stefancic and Delgado concede that lawyers are not the only unhappy work-
ers. The regimentation of thought and reasoning, they maintain, has occurred 
in the professions more broadly. This "tak[es] the life out of work and the 
professions, depriving them of juice, richness, concreteness, and anything else 
that might render them of human interest" (xi). They devote a chapter to the 
discontent of doctors and, in passing, to university professors. Expanding the 
circle of concern to include such people, however, leaves them open to the 
charge of class bias. Why pay special attention to those who traditionally have 
regarded themselves as "professionals"? Why is numbing routine and pressure 
5. Richard Posner, Overcoming Law 63 (Cambridge, Mass., 1995)· 
6. !d. at 92. 
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for performance recognized as a problem only when it infiltrates the work-
ing conditions of those who previously regarded themselves as above such 
things? 
The authors acknowledge that we need to provide "room to experiment, 
grow, and breathe" for "everyone-not just high-paid professionals" (81). Factory 
workers, they suggest, might be permitted to change jobs periodically, take 
breaks for exercise, and learn how their work relates to the product that the 
company sells. Such steps could enhance their potential to be creative, rather 
than leaving them simply to function as cogs in a well-oiled machine. 
Acknowledging the plight of workers in general responds to the charge 
of special pleading on behalf of lawyers. The price, of course, is that it robs 
concern about lawyers of any distinctiveness. From this perspective, Stefancic 
and Delgado's account of the legal profession is interesting as an example 
of a broader phenomenon-the stultification of creativity in the twenty-first 
century workplace. One might argue, however, that there is no reason to be 
concerned about this in law practice any more than in other occupations that 
have become industrialized-say, publishing or asset management. 
In sum, "formalism" seems hardly necessary to explain lawyers' unhappi-
ness. Most workers nowadays have too few opportunities to nurture imagina-
tive capacities, engage in recreation, and reflect upon dimensions oflife that are 
not tied to work demands. As is everyone else, lawyers are caught up in what 
David Harvey calls "space-time compression."7 The skeptic might argue that 
Stefancic and Delgado's book offers an interesting account of how a particular 
set of workers experiences this imbalance, but that lawyers' disenchantment is 
not unique, nor does it have any distinctive social implications. The level of 
generality at which Stefancic and Delgado conduct their diagnosis and pre-
scription unfortunately leave them ill-equipped to respond to such arguments. 
Lawyers and Abstraction 
Perhaps Stefancic and Delgado don't think that the dissatisfaction they see 
in the law practice is of any particular concern compared to other occupations. 
Maybe they are writing about lawyers simply because they teach future ones. 
Still, lawyers tend to exhibit levels of substance abuse and other ills at a rate 
higher than the rest of the population. What is it in their working lives that 
accounts for this? 
My view is that the authors' instincts are right, but we need to probe more 
deeply to discover what is going on. While the book doesn't make a persuasive 
argument that excessive abstraction is of particular concern in the work lives of 
lawyers, a good case can be made that it is. Furthermore, the consequences of 
lawyers' unease may have larger ramifications for society as a whole. 
Making this case requires that we recognize the unique role of law in human 
society as an effort to achieve both order and justice in human affairs. Law seeks 
7. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural 
Change (Cambridge, Mass., 1989)' 
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to impose some degree of order and predictability upon the inherent volatility 
of daily life. It attempts to achieve regularity by abstracting from the particu-
larity of events to deal with them on a plane of more general similarity and 
difference. This permits us to identify common patterns in otherwise unique 
occurrences. 
Thus, for instance, different individuals or organizations may fall within the 
category of lessor or lessee, debtor or creditor, and tortfeasor or victim. When 
confronted with messy emotions such as hope, anguish, trust, betrayal, fear, 
shame, or greed, law purports to tame their potentially terrifying intensity by 
translating them into dispassionate legal terms. J n this way, we aim to make 
them amenable to rational discourse and reasoned analysis. 
This suggests that the act of abstraction may have a different significance 
for lawyers than for other occupations. Computer engineers, for instance, also 
deal in abstractions at work. That process generally does not require them, 
however, to suppress the vivid particularity of human relationships in order 
to translate it into more neutral technical terms. The distinctive danger of the 
lawyer's task of abstraction is that she may come to approach existence in 
general with the same detachment that she displays at work. She may proceed 
based on the belief that human affairs and relationships can and should be 
subject to control and approached dispassionately and rationally. When we 
deal with the world in this way, emotion becomes the unwelcome disruptive 
force whose influence must be suppressed. 
Benjamin Sells, a psychotherapist and lawyer, has elaborated on this dan-
ger in some detail. 8 Sells suggests that perhaps the most primeval sense of law 
is as an alternative to anarchy. On this view, law is akin to an outside occupy-
ing force responsible for imposing and maintaining order on a restive popula-
tion.9 Crucial to law's ability to perform this function is a stance of objectivity. 
"Objectivity," says Sells, "translates visceral human experiences into schemata 
so they might be more easily compared" to other sets of facts with ostensibly 
similar doctrinal significance. ,0 
Think, for example, of the common experience offirst·year law students who 
begin to try out their new conceptual scheme on everyday life. Is a contract 
formed in the process of selecting food in the cafeteria? If so, when? Might 
you be vulnerable to tort liability if you leave a sharpened pencil protruding 
from your backpack? Do I have any kind of property right in a parking space 
I've selected? For awhile, it seems as if all of life can be reduced to instances of 
rights and obligations organized according to various legaldoctrines. 
Ideally, most lawyers come to strike a balance between this abstract per-
spective and an appreciation for the quirky and unique texture of daily experi-
8. Benjamin Sells, The Soul of the Law: Understanding Lawyers and the Law (Rockport, 
Mass., 1994). 
9. Id. at 29· 
10. /d. at 4J. 
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ence. Abstraction can be seductive, however, because it holds out the promise 
of order and control. Lawyers are not alone in being drawn to this promise. 
Modernity more generally emphasizes "belief in objective rationality as the 
supreme source of knowledge and understanding."" Sells argues, however, 
that this belief "exists in concentrated and powerful form in the lawyer. "12 The 
image of justice as blindfolded expresses faith in judgment abstracted from 
particularity. This aspiration has its virtues, as I discuss below. Those however, 
come with a cost: "Justice can no longer look out upon the world, can no lon-
ger appreciate its subtle variations and delicate distinetions."'3 
Excessive identification with abstract rationality may anesthesize the lawyer 
to experience. "[A]s rationality is exalted, other forms of psychological existence 
are oppressed, relegated to lower stations, and stripped of power and influ-
ence."14 Lawyers lose their "imaginal diversity" and find it difficult to become 
emotionally involved in the world. They see personal relationships as threats to 
the detachment that appears to furnish a sense of power and control. 
We thus may have particular reason to be concerned about the impact of 
excessive abstraction on lawyers. Constant translation of visceral and emotion-
ally charged experience into the more detached categories of legal doctrine 
may take a severe toll on the capacity for an appropriately wide range of emo-
tional responses. For this reason, law's aspiration to order may provide insight 
into the cost of undue reliance in law practice on what Stefancic and Delgado 
call formalism. 
Law aspires not only to order but to justice. This also has implications for 
the balance of abstraction and particularity in lawyers' work lives. We can see 
this by appreciating two dimensions of justice. The first is justice as appropri-
ate moral responses to particular circumstances and predicaments. In dispute 
resolution, for instance, it requires determining who was wronged and who is 
to blame. In transactional work, it involves understanding what a party wants 
to accomplish and asking if it is consistent with standards such as good faith 
and fairness. In providing advice on regulatory compliance, it leads one to ask 
whether, for instance, the activity is the type that the tax code wants to encour-
age, or is the sort that environmental law seeks to restrict. Thus, to have faith 
that law can do justice, we need to believe that it is sensitive to the richness and 
complexity of human behavior and the visceral moral responses that it evokes. 
At the same time, justice reflects the idea that law is impersonal-that it 
treats persons in accordance with general principles that apply across various 
situations. This, of course, is expressed in the image that I mentioned earlier: 
law as blindfolded. From this perspective, law must abstract from particular-
ity to express our basic equality as legal subjects. This process seeks to isolate 
II. !d. at 102. 
12. !d. at 102. 
'3- !d. at 43. 
'4· [d. at 103. 
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general characteristics that serve as the criteria for legal treatment, so that legal 
interpretation does not depend on the unique identity of the parties or the 
decision maker involved. 
Any legal system must balance these two dimensions of justice to preserve 
the belief that law represents a genuine effort to invest existence with moral 
meaning. Excessive attention to the dimension of particularity can erode this 
belief by fostering a sense that decisionmakers are free to engage in favoritism 
or indulge their own preferences without any constraints on their power. An 
excessive focus on abstraction can erode it by creating the impression that the 
law is a sterile system of rules that are unconnected to any fundamental human 
concerns. 
We tend to think of achieving this balance as something that is primar-
ily the province of judges. Practicing lawyers, however, confront it every day. 
They must consider it in the arguments they make before tribunals, the advice 
they give their clients, and the legal analyses in which they engage. These 
activities all send a message about the nature of the law. A lawyer who persis-
tently focuses on manipulating the letter of the law while ignoring its spirit 
eventually communicates that law primarily is a set of abstract rules available 
for creative exploitation. A lawyer who attends only to a sense of the felt exi-
gencies in a given situation regardless of legal rules communicates that we are 
a society governed by individuals rather than laws. 
Seen against this backdrop, we can appreciate why what Stefancic and Del-
gado describe as an excess of abstraction in lawyers' work lives can be problem-
atic in distinctive ways. On a personal level, lawyers confront human stories 
that evoke visceral moral responses; on a professional level, they are consis-
tently denied recourse to those responses when they do their work. Instead, 
many believe that they must devote themselves to manipulating the rules as 
effectivcly as possible to achieve what their clients want as long as it's argu-
ably legal. It's easy to see that this can be a recipe for cynicism and despair, 
because it undermines the very notion that human beings can achieve some 
degree of moral order by establishing a legal system. It's thus not surprising 
that William Simon would say, "No social role encourages such ambitious 
moral aspirations as the lawyer's, and no social role so consistently disappoints 
the aspirations that it encourages. "'5 
On a social level, this kind of disillusionment for lawyers may produce a 
similarly corrosive effect. If those who devote their lives to the law lose confi-
dence in its moral potential, why should anyone else believe in it? Loss of faith 
in the ability of law to achieve justice incites anger, opportunism, and nihilism: 
"Justice? You get justice in the next world, in this world you have the law."16 
In these ways, the dominance of what Stefancic and Delgado characterize 
as formalism can have profound consequences for both lawyers and society as 
'5. William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1998). 
16. William Gaddis, A Frolic of His Own '3 (New York, 1995)' 
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a whole. If this is the case, how do we right the balance? Unfortunately, the 
authors offer little guidance on how to do so beyond the example of the law· 
yer who plans to make time to visit a new bookstore. Lawyers certainly need 
to make time for activities that nurture their imagination beyond the law. It 
would be helpful, however, to have some sense of the bigger structural forces 
that shape current practice and how we might try to influence them. 
The Broader Context 
We need a richer sense of both history and the dynamics of modern law 
practice than this book provides. Stefancic and Delgado generally draw on 
experience in private practice, especially law firms, in making their points. An 
increasing number of lawyers practice in firms, and the firms themselves are 
growing dramatically through mergers and acquisitions. In addition, corpo-
rate legal departments have grown in both size and stature in recent decades. 
In light of these developments, we need to acknowledge more explicitly 
what we often seem to ignore or even repress: many, perhaps most, lawyers 
represent business corporations. Recognizing this fact oflife does not mean 
that a large percentage of lawyers are indifferent to considerations of justice 
or social welfare, or that we must radically revise our professional aspirations 
downward. It does mean, however, that we need a clear-eyed awareness of 
the distinctive features of corporate representation if we are to have any hope 
of promoting justice and social welfare, or realizing traditional professional 
ideals, in a large segment of law practice. 
It's important to recognize that corporate responses to changes in market 
conditions have powerfully shaped large law firms. The integrated law firm first 
arose in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to meet the expanding 
legal needs of corporations of unprecedented scope and scale in the decades 
after the Civil War. Solo practitioners or small law offices simply were inad-
equate to deal with the legal work generated by enterprises such as transconti-
nental railroads, oil production and refining companies, and steel manufactur-
ing entities. By the early twentieth century, Paul Cravath had institutionalized 
the corporate law firm in a form whose influence is still felt today. I) 
Significantly, for many years corporations preferred to contract for most of 
their legal services from independent law firms, rather than meet their needs 
by hiring lawyers as company employees. Regulation was relatively minimal, 
so executives may not have seen legal costs as a constant and significant cost 
of doing business. In addition, legal analysis was less amenable to standard 
production techniques than other corporate services, which made it more dif-
ficult to integrate it into the corporate bureaucracy. Furthermore, corporate 
enterprise presented fundamental challenges to conventional legal doctrine, 
and companies may have wanted to rely on the experience of lawyers with 
1]- See generally Robert T. Swaine, 2 The Cravath Firm and Its Predecessors 1819'1948 (New 
York,1948). 
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wide contacts in the political and business community. Lawyers who served 
more than one client could offer this benefit. Is 
Finally, while there was variation among companies and industries, many 
corporations enjoyed a relatively substantial degree of market power until the 
last few decades of the twentieth century. This was of course especially true 
immediately after World War II. The result may have been less pressure for 
cost containment and strict efficiency in the use of legal services. 
For much of the twentieth century, the large law firm enjoyed a significant 
degree of market power, with minimal competition for both clients and law-
yers. Relationships with clients were long-term, partners came almost solely 
from the ranks of associates, and firms were able to give some weight to eco-
nomic and non-economic considerations in how they organized their prac-
tices. It was not that law firm practice was a profession, rather than a business. 
It was decidedly a business, but one that operated under oligopolistic market 
conditions. I9 
Some claim that such market power gave lawyers the opportunity to offer 
advice to corporate clients that took a long-term perspective, and which con-
sidered to some degree non-financial social and moral concems. 20 That is, they 
had some latitude to speak with clients about not only the letter but the spirit 
of the law. In Stefancic and Delgado's terms, they were able to offer advice that 
treated the law not simply formally, but as a practice that affirmed the norms 
immanent in particular situations and circumstances. They were able to say 
"no" to their clients because the clients trusted them, and because they had the 
intricate knowledge of the client's operations that created the opportunity to 
fashion alternatives that could accomplish the client's goals without running 
afoul of social boundaries. 
It's impossible to evaluate these claims with any degree of certainty. To 
some extent, they may be simply self-serving assertions by an older generation 
of lawyers who resent being shoved aside by younger, more entrepreneurial 
colleagues. 2I In addition, lest we accept too quickly this characterization of a 
bygone golden age, we must recognize that firms openly discriminated against 
women, racial minorities, and individuals of certain ethnic backgrounds. Final-
ly, the close relationship between law firm and client may have led to sins of 
blindness rather than willfulness. That is, even if lawyers may have been likely 
IS. See generally Wayne K. Hobson, The American Legal Profession and the Organizational 
Society 1890-1930 (New York, 1986); Thomas Paul Pinansky, The Emergence of Law Firms 
in the American Legal Profession, 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 593 (1986-87)' 
19- See generally Paul Hoffman, Lions in the Street (New York, 1973); Erwin Smigel, The Wall 
Street Lawyer: Professional Organization Man? (New York, 1964)-
20. Anthony Kronman, for instance, maintains that "[f]or a hundred years the large corporate 
firm has been the principal standard-bearer of the lawyer-statesman ideal in the sphere of 
private practice." Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 273 (Cambridge, Mass., 1993)' 
21. See Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Colden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 Dick. L. 
Rev. 549 (1996)· 
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to counsel their clients not to ignore the adverse impact of their actions, they 
may have internalized the client's perspective so completely that they were 
oblivious to many occasions on which there was such impact. 
Despite these caveats, there is some plausibility to the claim that market 
power created at least some space for more wide-ranging, and less formalis-
tic, legal advice. Milbank Tweed, for instance, consistently gave conservative 
advice to Chase Manhattan Bank about activities that might run afoul of 
restrictions on interstate banking." Similarly, Lord Day & Lord advised the 
New York Times that concern for the public interest should lead the paper to 
grant the Attorney General's request not to publish the Pentagon Papers!3 In 
addition, it is striking how many large firm partners participated in legal and 
political reform movements and engaged in public service, from the very first 
years that the large law firm first strode onto stage!4 
The shift toward the "industrialization" of legal services that Posner 
describes reflects the intensification of competition for many corporations and 
industries in recent decades!5 Accelerated technological developments and 
global competition have created considerable instability and unpredictability 
for business corporations. This has created greater pressure to obtain cost-
effective services. In addition, the proliferation of regulation has made legal 
services a more significant component of corporate budgets. In response, most 
major corporations have sought greater control over the provision of these 
services by significantly increasing both the size and responsibilities of their 
in-house legal departments. 
As a result, law firms no longer can count on steady business from particular 
clients, but must earn the right to represent them on specific matters. Corpora-
tions use the competition among law firms to gain concessions on price, con-
trols over staffing, and a major voice in decisions. In addition, firms now face 
fierce competition for lawyers, with profitable partners periodically moving to 
more lucrative opportunities, sometimes bringing entire practice groups with 
them to other firms. Law firms have responded to this heightened exposure to 
market forces by adopting more explicit business strategies and measures to 
make their delivery of services more efficient and profitable_'6 Greater special-
~~. See Ellen Joan Pollock, Turks and Brahmins: Upheaval at Milbank, Tweed: Wall Street's 
Gentlemen Take Off Their Gloves 96-97, 99 (New York, 1990). 
~3. See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 100-01. 
24. See Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of 
New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil War 
America 61, ed. Gerard W. Gawalt (Westport, Conn., 1984); Robert W. Gordon, Corporate 
Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 Md. L. Rev. 255,267'75 (1990). 
25. Richard A. D'Aveni and Lacy Glenn Thomas, The Rise of Hypercompetition From 1950 to 
2002: Evidence of Increasing Structural Destabilization and Temporary Competitive Ad-
vantage (October n, 2004). Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2004-11, available 
at <http://ssm.com/abstract=6n823> (last visited on July 3, 2005)' 
26. See generally Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transforma-
tion of the Big Law Firm (Chicago, 1991). 
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ization, merger with or acquisition of other firms, and compensation accord-
ing to productivity rather than seniority are all reflections of this trend. 
The reduction oflaw firm market power vis-a-vis corporate clients has impli-
cations for what Stefancic and Delgado characterize as the balance between 
formalist and non-formalist approaches to law practice. Confronted with 
relentless competitive pressures, many corporate clients tend to be preoccu-
pied with financial performance on a quarterly basis. When missing earnings 
estimates by a penny a share can result in a drop of I2 percent in share price, 
there seems little room to consider anything beyond the bottom line.'7 
In this world, corporations want to know how lawyers can "add value" to 
the business enterprise."s This may involve pushing the envelope with legal 
advice, and letting the client decide how much of a risk it wants to take of vio-
lating the law. At their crassest, corporations treat law purely instrumentally, 
as an obstacle to be creatively surmounted, rather than as a set of pronounce-
ments with any intrinsic normative force."9 Treating law formally, and focusing 
solely on gaming the system by manipulating doctrinal rules, is the hallmark 
of such an approach to law practice. 
The imbalance that Stefancic and Delgado describe has its roots in the 
changing market conditions of corporate capitalism. In the face of increasing 
competitive pressures, many clients may not be especially interested in obtain-
ing legal advice that takes account of broad social or moral considerations. 
They have no desire to be instructed by what Anthony Kronman has called 
the "lawyer-statesman."30 As with other professionals, lawyers are "no longer 
experts offering professional and autonomous advice on how best to steer the 
economy. They [have become] employees subject to the market forces they 
believed they controlled."3' 
This may seem to offer a bleak prognosis for modern law firm practice. Yet 
it also suggests a potential vehicle for changing the conditions of that prac-
tice: placing political pressure on corporations to respect and accommodate 
important social values. The broader the range of concerns for which corpo-
rations are held accountable, the more considerations the lawyer can take into 
account in advising the corporate client on what is in its best interest. Some 
contend that the range of those concerns is widening, and that the corpora-
27. See Gary Rivlin, Ebay Misses Forecast by a Bit, and Shares Fall, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 2005, 
at CI. 
28. See Robert Eli Rosen, We're All Consultants Now: How Change in Client Organizational 
Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services, 44 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 637, 681 (2002). 
29. For a description and critique of this approach, see Cynthia Williams, Corporate Compli-
ance With the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1265 (1998). 
30. Kronman, supra note 20, at II. 
31. Mark Tushnet, A Public Philosophy for the Professional-Managerial Class, in Debating 
Democracy's Discontent; Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy 92, 92, 
Anita Allen and Milton Regan, cds. (New York, 1998). 
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tions that thrive will be those that meet the challenge of addressing them.32 If 
so, such a development provides the opportunity-indeed, the responsibility-
for lawyers to go beyond formal analysis of legal doctrine in the discussions 
that they have with their clients.33 This expansion of the lawyer's role could 
help restore some of the satisfaction that seems to have gone out of practice 
for so many lawyers. 
Placing the dominance of what Stefancic and Delgado call formalism 
in historical and economic context thus suggests that changes in law firm 
practice likely will require more fundamental changes in corporate America. 
Pressing for such changes may well be done most effectively from outside the 
corporation and the large law firms that represent it. Lawyers, in other words, 
need outsiders-interest groups, legislators, and litigants, for example-to pro-
vide them opportunities to draw on social considerations in counseling their 
clients. 
This may be some cause for hope, but it also leads to two sobering observa-
tions. First, and most obvious, the challenges of inducing socially responsible 
behavior by corporations can be enormously daunting. Multinational com-
panies can engage in regulatory arbitrage, and informal pressures may result 
in public relations responses that do little to address underlying problems. 
Collective action problems abound, and corporations have vast resources that 
they are willing to devote to avoiding limitations on their freedom of action. 
Second, even a lawyer advising a corporation that it must take account of 
non-economic concerns typically will have to counsel her client in the language 
of economic self-interest. "Think how this would look on the front page of the 
unll StreetJoumal," or "We're going to risk losing a major group of customers if 
we're seen as exploiting child labor in the Third World," are arguments likely 
to be taken especially seriously by corporate clients. Even in a world of more 
expansive corporate social responsibility, the lawyer may have to sacrifice the 
ability to speak in explicit moral terms in order to be effective. This is not to 
suggest that corporate managers are indifferent to moral concerns. Rather, it 
is a realistic acknowledgment of the constraints under which many of them 
operate, and the considerations that they seek to balance. The lawyer can feel 
gratified that the client takes her advice that ethics is good for business. This 
may not, however, fully satisfy the desire in law practice to refer more directly 
to the underlying values that law seeks to promote. 
This suggests that exploring the working lives of lawyers in private law 
practice and corporate legal departments requires appreciation of the trade-
offs those practice settings involve. The more powerful the client, the larger 
32. See, e.g., Lynn Sharp Paine, Value Shift: Why Companies Must Merge Social and Financial 
Imperatives to Achieve Superior Performance (New York, 2003). 
33. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Model Rule 
2.1, Comment 2 (2005) (purely technical legal advice may be inadequate; lawyer may need 
to refer to broader considerations); Rule 2.1 (lawyer may "refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors, that may be relevant to 
the client's situation"). 
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the lawyer's compensation, and the more she is subject to the risks and rewards 
of market pressures-but also, the greater the potential impact of legal advice 
that reflects an expansive view of the client's responsibility. The number of 
opportunities to provide such advice, however, and the client's willingness to 
heed it, may depend on forces outside the lawyer's control. Even when such 
opportunities arise, the lawyer in many cases will have to use an instumental 
vocabulary rather than one that directly refers to justice or other moral values. 
High compensation and professional prestige thus may carry with it certain 
types of costs. 
By contrast, lawyers who practice outside these settings may have a great-
er sense of the integration of personal and professional life because of their 
ability to speak in a less constrained language. They may, however, enjoy less 
financial compensation, and fewer opportunities on a daily basis to help move 
powerful clients directly toward socially responsible behavior. They also may 
receive less professional prestige by conventional standards. A sense of inte-
grated personal and work commitments, in other words, may come at a price. 
Lawyers in these two broad practice categories are likely to confront dif-
ferent sources of contentment and disenchantment. This framework is one 
example of how we might try to begin mapping in more systematic fashion 
the details of lawyers' work lives. We will need to move well beyond this level 
of generality, however, to understand the texture and dynamics of modern law 
practice. We need to examine the experiences of specific lawyers in particular 
practice organizations. To what extent does a practice organization recognize 
the tensions and influences with which its lawyers must contend? What kinds 
of policies and structures does it adopt in response to them? How feasible is 
it to create and sustain a distinct organizational culture that tries to balance 
multiple values? Detailed case studies and rich narratives, not sweeping gen-
eralizations, will be most valuable in this effort. 
I suspect that such research will indicate that it is extremely difficult for 
lawyers to fashion work lives in which they are able harmoniously to integrate 
all the personal and professional values that they consider important. In this 
respect they may be no different from anyone else-but it will be useful to 
identify the trade-offs that lawyers must make in general, as well as in particular 
kinds of practices. Among other things, such a step would be useful in giving 
students a clearer understanding of the landscape that they must traverse as 
they enter the profession. 
Conclusion 
The main limitation of How Lawyers Lose 'Iheir VVtzy is, ironically enough, 
that it employs general abstractions, rather than the fine-grained observation 
that it prescribes. The chapter on MacLeish is the most nuanced discussion 
in the book. Even it, however, tends to proclaim, rather than demonstrate, 
MacLeish's struggle to balance different sensibilities. In addition, that strug-
gle is presented as the project of a single individual, isolated from the broader 
context of law practice in his time and unconnected to our own. Stefancic and 
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Delgado are right to suggest that what they describe as formalism plays a role 
in lawyers' dissatisfactions. For this suggestion to yield any insight, however, 
we need much more than this book provides: a more sharply focused account 
of formalism, a more subtle examination of its consequences for practicing 
lawyers, and a deeper appreciation of how varying practice conditions can 
contribute to-or allay-the imbalance that many lawyers apparently feeL We 
need, in other words, less formalism about formalism. 
